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Religious Symbols
Made in Italy
During the last Italian electoral cam-
paign, in March 2006, then Prime Min-
ister Berlusconi declared that “we do 
not want Italy to become a multiethnic, 
multicultural country; we are proud of 
our culture and of our tradition.”1 This 
article addresses the context, implica-
tions and social counterparts of such 
increasingly heard statements. Italy is 
currently the country with the high-
est rate of migrant population increase 
after the U.S. It has a regolare (docu-
mented) migrant population of at least 
3 million (5.2 percent of the total popu-
lation), including both EU and non-EU citizens. Of this, “Muslims” con-
stitute 33.2 percent, while “Christians” (Catholic, Orthodox, and other) 
49.1 percent.2 
Migration and the nation 
With one of the lowest birth rates in the world, Italy will face a se-
vere crisis in its pension system unless it manages to attract signifi-
cant numbers of migrant workers.3 And while thousands of potential 
workers have to risk their lives to arrive in Italy—given the paucity of 
legal channels of migration and asylum—Italian entrepreneurs con-
stantly argue with the national government because the regionally al-
lotted quotas of migrant workers are inadequate 
to satisfy their demand of cheap labour. Thus, a 
focus on empirical data and everyday encoun-
ters shows a very ambiguous picture. On the one 
hand, this picture is not necessarily as gloomy as 
the decontextualized “cultural war” analyses and 
normative statements à la Berlusconi would sug-
gest. At the same time, class solidarity and critical 
citizenship wither vis-à-vis national construction 
and identitarian, cultural, and religious concerns. 
And migrants, increasingly “becoming” “Muslims” 
(that is, talked about, represented, and perhaps 
seeing themselves as such) conveniently function 
as racialized, gendered, surveyed, and exploitable 
subjects and workers.
Locating national controversies
When right-wing Italian politicians abstractly use 
the improbable rhetoric of the Crusades or draw 
arbitrary connections between the Ottomans’ brief 
conquest of Otranto in southeastern Italy (1480–1) 
and contemporary migration influxes, they en-
counter very scarce popular resistance. More disturbingly, in the last few 
years Italy has started witnessing pervasive controversies stemming from 
the concern with religion and migration. But are Muslim communities 
or representatives the igniters and active protagonists of these contro-
versies? In November 2006, when Swedish IKEA and other Italian and 
multinational corporations announced that presepi (nativity sets) would 
be taken off the shelves due to low sales, centre-right political repre-
sentatives organized a short-lived boycott and denounced the episode 
as one more example of relativism “paving the way to Islamic extrem-
ism.”4 Similarly, 2004 saw the explosion (and rapid eclipse) of a presepe 
controversy involving Italian schoolteachers and parents (rather than mi-
grant or “Muslim” ones) concerned with the display of religious symbols 
in a specific public school in northern Italy. The issue was assigned a pri-
mary role in the national media, arguably because of the emotional and 
commercial appeal of interreligious controversies in the first place. The 
problem was championed by the 9 De-
cember 2004 TV talk show Porta a Porta. 
With the controversy posed as an attack 
to the presepe tradition by Muslims, self-
anointed secular “defenders” of presepe 
could emerge in the show, advocating 
the “rights of Italians” and the incontest-
ability of the traditionally unchallenged 
display of nativity sets in public schools. 
They performed the familiar discourse 
of the preservation vis-à-vis newcomers 
of identity, culture, and tradition, em-
bodied in public presepe. On the other 
hand, eminent Cardinal Ersilio Tonini, 
paradoxically known for his moderately conservative standpoints, se-
verely attacked his fellow TV guests. He chastised these national govern-
ment politicians for destroying the country’s future with their radically 
anti-Islamic viewpoints and statements. Later during the 2004 Christmas 
season I visited a poster session on migration in a socially engaged parish 
in Bari, southern Italy. A banner hanging over dozens of fair-trade nativ-
ity sets from around the world provided a “Catholic” counterpoint to the 
self-proclaimed “secularist” anti-immigration and anti-Islamic arguments 
of the public defenders of presepe: “Christmas is the holiday of an immi-
grant. Jesus too would be an immigrant today, with his family. There is a 
deep connection between the holy family and the innocent families of all 
times enduring trials and suffering.” 
Similarly, it is well known that the Catholic crucifix is customarily dis-
played in Italian public spaces such as schools and tribunals. Yet, the fact 
that “even among those who are extremely open to immigrants and to 
other religions the rate of consent to the presence of the Christian sym-
bol is 78%”5 does not imply that these people automatically agree on the 
“meaning” of the crucifix prior to its representation, legal enforcement, 
and cultural understanding. Every “meaning,” including that of presepe 
and of the crucifix, must be investigated, dissected, and analyzed as a so-
cially located and enforced one.6 Historically, the crucifix is the ultimately 
open-ended object of vibrant theological debate and two millennia of 
varied religious practice. At present, redundant statements on its display, 
ultimate meaning, and essential nature increasingly reduce it to a limited 
symbol. In short, it is now conscripted as an icon of “Italian liberal-demo-
cratic and Republican values,” “national identity,” “universal compassion,” 
“the West,” and, ironically, “secular tolerance.” As such, it is deployed, most 
often by non-religious pundits and politicians, in marked contrast to mi-
gration and, in particular, the alleged patriarchy, intolerance, and illiberal-
ism ascribed to Islam. In this usage, the crucifix evidently contradicts con-
temporary Catholic social teachings and becomes an exclusionary tool 
directed against “atheists,” “minorities,” “Jews,” “Muslims,” and others—mi-
grants and Italians alike. 
Making “others” and “selves”
Shallow controversies, rather than pluralistic and constructive debates, 
monopolize news-making and public intellectuals’ knowledge produc-
tion for a short time, until their commercial and ideological expiration. 
The media present such controversies as matters directly impacting Ital-
ians’ physicality, rights, identity, and religious and cultural traditions, now 
to be “defended.” Television talk shows, in particular, function as arenas 
for starlets, opinion-makers, and politicians vying for visibility. Here, skir-
mishes on issues of immigration and religion among a half-dozen guests, 
such as in the above-mentioned presepe case, become proxies for “public 
debates,” through which a national public and the Muslim disruptive ex-
ception are simultaneously produced. And yet, often local governments 
at the regional, provincial, and municipal levels are establishing their own 
policies and understandings of migration and Muslim practice, with “cul-
While Italian pundits and politicians purport a 
world of cultural-religious friction, systematic 
monitoring of the Italian mediascape and 
extensive ethnographic fieldwork illuminate 
a far more complex picture. Ambiguous 
everyday encounters coexist with structural 
inequality and exclusionary discourses. The 
periodic controversies dominating the popular 
media—over religious symbols, migration, and 
“Islam”—chart moral (and even theologically 
laden) political visions that function to 
inculcate new mechanisms of social control and 
boundary making in Italy.
[Through] television 
talk shows … 
a national public 
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tural” exchanges, contingent agreements on specific practical problems, 
and discursive and pragmatic contrasts vis-à-vis national discourses and 
policies of immigration. Non-governmental organizations participating 
in the management of migration show a variety of political referents and 
agendas. Similarly, in Italian Catholic venues I have encountered extreme 
variation of opinions and convictions about migration and “Islam,” not 
reflected in sketchy cultural clash arguments. At a conference, for exam-
ple, Father Mimmo reminded his audience of lay secondary school teach-
ers that “there is goodness inherent in Islam” and that John Paul II once 
kissed a copy of the Quran.7 In contrast, another priest, the director of an 
extremely efficient Caritas facility of primary assistance and sheltering of 
migrants, told me in an interview that Muslim guests are not allowed to 
pray in any room of the facility. In fact, he said, that would entitle them 
potentially later to claim that space of prayer as Islamic.
Despite such doses of scepticism, “first-hand,” socially embedded rela-
tionships with Muslims have the potential to work as a framework against 
which knowledge produced about Muslims through the mass media and 
other desocialized discourses may be appraised and verified. And diverse 
socio-cultural relations do happen, between persons who might or might 
not be interested in abstract “interreligious dialogue,” but who neverthe-
less pragmatically interact in the workplace, the parish, the classroom, or 
the neighbourhood. For many other Italians instead, especially in non-
metropolitan and remote areas, the knowledge of “Muslims” acquired 
through the media constitutes the background informing potential fu-
ture relationships with Muslim individuals or groups, as the “veil” example 
below suggests. 
Ms. Beba, the director of a Caritas parish centre in Lecce matching job 
offers with migrant availability, admitted that local elderly people (or 
relatives on their behalf ) sometimes ask explicitly for Christian domes-
tic caregivers, because they would feel embarrassed about “passeggiare 
[going for a walk] and being seen with somebody with a veil on their 
head.” This example is indicative of the bundled characteristics that are 
being naturally and superficially associated with Islam and that make it 
“known” to many Italians through the mass media: the veil is one of them, 
arguably also as a consequence of widely publicized French debates on 
the subject. The example also suggests the lack of significance of these 
characteristics: as elsewhere in other regions of southern Europe, many 
older Catholic women in Lecce cover their head with black or coloured 
foulards, in church as in everyday life outside the house. Finally, this ex-
ample illustrates the essentially social and relational nature of the con-
cern about the appropriateness of “religious” symbols and practices. It is 
not that clients are uncomfortable with veiled women per se. Rather, they 
are “ashamed” to be seen with veiled women during the social ritual of 
passeggiata [promenade], taking for granted a collective stigma on the 
veil that, while pervading dominant discourses, might or might not be 
empirically accurate. 
Drawing and resisting conclusions
Both “migration” and “religion” (read: “Islam”) are often politically and 
analytically tackled as challenges to the nation-state and the EU. In this 
view they challenge sovereignty, church-state separation, and amicable 
relationships and the postulated cultural, religious, identitarian, and de-
mographic balance of Italy, the EU and, in general, of secular liberal de-
mocracies. Interesting research questions emerge when such essentially 
governmental concerns centred on “challenge” are turned inside out. 
Thus, how is the liberal-democratic, secular, Western national body con-
structed vis-à-vis “religious” migrants? How is national and supranational 
sovereignty performed and reinforced vis-à-vis migrants’ transgression? 
In this perspective, then, controversies over “religious symbols,” male and 
female genital modification, dhabiha (ritual slaughter), mosque building, 
and the public display of Catholic crucifixes should prompt analyses of 
underlying ethnocentric concerns, imperial gazes, and governmental 
stakes.
In particular, if what is crucial for governments at various levels is not 
“homogeneity versus difference as such” but the authority and preroga-
tive to define crucial homogeneities and differences,8 then “religion” is 
not the object of impossible exclusion, but rather of governmental inter-
vention. Entering and often engendering morally charged controversies 
on the meaning of the crucifix, the religious normativity of the veil, the 
appropriateness of the Prophet’s depiction and other such complex is-
sues, secular governmental actors increasingly produce a pervasive 
“knowledge” about such tropes and about the (Muslim) people, beliefs, 
and religious practices supposedly igniting related problems. Support-
ing a pervasive moral construction and evaluation 
of “difference,” they also draw boundaries defining 
“the nation,” “the public,” “Italian civilization,” and 
“Judeo-Christian Europe.” Normative, ethical, and 
even theological arguments are increasingly articu-
lated and disseminated by “secular” governmen-
tal actors. In contrast, I contend, social scientists 
should focus not on the retrieval of the supposed 
“meaning” or nature of certain “religious” symbols 
and tropes. Rather, they should engage the social, 
cultural, and political implications that such contro-
versies and governmental knowledge production 
have in constituting and reproducing dominant 
ideas about the liberal-democratic individual, the 
resulting national community, the feminized mi-
grant, the religious fundamentalist, and so forth. 
For it seems that these controversies increasingly 
function as virtual “monuments,” admonitions, and 
warnings on what the nation, civilization, Chris-
tendom, and Europe should be. In particular, the 
ongoing quest for a solution to what being Euro-
pean (or Italian, German, etc.) means is not only an 
unsolved problem, but ideally an unsolvable one as 
well. Any final solution would result in further in-
stitutionalization of an exclusionary, ethnocentric, 
and necessarily undemocratic regime of citizenship 
and membership. 
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